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PART I: INTRODUCTION-THE OMNIPRESENCE OF
CHARITABLE ORGANIZATIONS
H.L. Mencken once wrote, "Conscience is the inner voice that warns us
somebody may be looking."' In dealing with the nonprofit sector, and
public charities in particular, the law has been reluctant to place too many
burdens upon those who have fiduciary responsibilities to the organization.
Instead, we have relied upon the conscience and integrity of those who head
nonprofits to adhere to their duties and act in a manner that best serves the
missions of their particular organizations. But are we ignoring human
nature by placing too much faith in the executives and directors of nonprofit
entities to do the right thing? In an area where funding for oversight
agencies is inadequate and enforcement is sporadic, can conscience carry the
day when no one is looking?
This article examines the doctrine of standing and how it has limited
those who are able to sue to enforce the fiduciary obligations of charity
insiders. The case is then made that more regulation without a means of
enforcement is futile, and that a simple expansion of the doctrine of standing
will ensure that more eyes are trained upon the actions of nonprofit directors
H.L. MENCKEN, A MENCKEN CHRESTOMATHY (1949).
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and executives. In turn, such expanded oversight will increase compliance
with the regulations that are already in place.
In today's world, tax-exempt charitable organizations of all shapes and
sizes perform valuable functions upon which all members of our society
have invariably depended at one time or another.2 The mission statements
of these various organizations are viewed as worthwhile, and our
government rewards the existence and efforts of charities by conferring upon
them tax-exempt status.3 The justifications for the tax-exemption to
charitable organizations have been many and hotly debated among legal
scholars.4 Regardless of the preferred rationale for the charitable exemption,
the reality is that it is utilized by nearly 1.4 million nonprofit organizations
each spring.' Yet, even this number fails to tell the whole story, as churches
and other religious organizations that are also exempt from taxation are not
included in this statistic.
6
While charitable organizations perform a role that is essential to the
well-being of our nation, the amount of money that the United States
government is relinquishing as a result of the tax-exemption is staggering.
The total revenue for organizations that claimed a tax-exemption in the year
1995 was equal to 12.4% of the gross domestic product of the United States.7
This money, which is not paid to the government by way of taxation, is
either lost at the expense of government programs or it is subsidized by the
very citizens for whose benefit these charitable organizations were created.
The purpose of the foregoing was not to suggest that a tax-exemption for
charitable organizations is outdated or inefficient, but only to highlight the
fact that reciprocity exists in the charitable sector. That is, while citizens
benefit greatly from the existence of charities, so too do these organizations
benefit from the charitable social contract that exists with the citizens.' As
2 Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code defines a tax-exempt charitable organization
as any organization that is operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, literary or educational
purposes or for the purpose of testing for public safety, fostering amateur sports competition or for the
prevention of cruelty to children or animals. 26 U.S.C. S 501(c)(3) (2002).
3 Id.
4 See Nina J. Crimm, An Explanation of the Federal Income Tax Exemption for Charitable
Organizations:A Theory ofRisk Compensation, 50U. FLA. L. REv. 419 (1998) (describing the author's theory
of the exemption justification as one of risk compensation and comparing other explanations for the
exemption). See also Michael J. Barry, A Sensible Alternative to Revoking the Boy Scouts' Tax Exemption, 30
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 137 (2002).
5 National Center for Charitable Statistics, Number of Nonprofit Organizations in the United States
1996-2004,at http'/nccsdataweb.urban.org/PubApps/profilel.php?state'=US (last visited Sept. 17,2005).
6 FRANCES R. HILL & DOUGLAS M. MANCINO, TAXATION OF EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS
1.01, 1-2 n.2 (2002) (citing 1999 IRS Data Book, Publication 55b, Table 27).
7 Id. at 1-2.
8 The idea of the charitable social contract is that essentially "people are generally willing to
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noted by Susan Gary, where public dollars support a charity instead of being
collected from the charity as tax, then the public has an interest in ensuring
that those dollars are spent on a public, rather than a private purpose.
9
The focus of this article is on the interest of the citizens, who are the
ultimate beneficiaries of charitable organizations, to be reassured that
charitable organizations are being operated in a manner that is consistent
with the fiduciary duties of charity directors and executives.10 Specifically,
when funds are diverted away from a charity's stated purpose and into the
pockets of the directors and executives of that charity, who then has standing
to bring suit on behalf of the public? Part II of this article will begin by
providing an overview of charitable corporations in the United States and
outline the characteristics necessary for an organization to qualify for tax-
exempt status. Part III will then describe the distinction between private
foundations and public charities, two kinds of organizations that fall under
the umbrella of "tax-exempt charities." In Part IV, this article examines the
law to determine what safeguards are in place to ensure that directors of both
types of charities are faithful to their fiduciary duties and whether those
safeguards are both adequate and consistent for each type of organization.
In Part V, focus is shifted to the available enforcement mechanisms that exist
both to prevent and punish the misconduct of charitable insiders and why
those current mechanisms are insufficient to protect the public's interest in
charity. In a final section, Part VI examines the inconsistent application of
standing to the enforcement of charitable fiduciary duties. It is then
suggested that an expansion of standing in the charitable realm by states'
legislatures would better serve the goal of ensuring that charitable
organizations are efficiently and responsibly managed.11
'spend' through taxation in support of charitable activity which they would not support directly, because
other taxpayers 'spend' reciprocally." Laura B. Chisolm, Exempt Organization Advocacy: Matching the Rules
to the Rationales, 63 IND. L.J. 201,251 (1987-1988).
9 Susan Gary, Regulating the Management of Charities: Trust Law, Corporate Law, and Tax Law, 21
U. HAW. L. REV. 593, 617 (1999).
10 This article will specifically deal with the dangers inherent when charitable fiduciaries violate
their duty of loyalty to the organization by converting charitable funds for their own personal use. For
a more detailed explanation of the trinity of duties (i.e. duties of care, loyalty, and obedience), see id. at
598-615.
" No suggestions of additional state driven regulatory means for ensuring charitable
responsibility will be discussed in this paper. This article will instead concentrate on how an expansion
of standing doctrine in the nonprofit sector could serve to change and make more efficient the internal
governance of such organizations. For a discussion of regulatory changes that could increase charitable
accountability, see generally Robert C. Degaudenzi, Tax-Exempt Public Charities: Increasing Accountability
and Compliance, 36CATH. LAW203 (1995) (suggesting the implementation of intermediate sanctions and
an increase in the quality of public charity disclosure as possible solutions).
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PART II: WHO QUALIFIES FOR A TAX-EXEMPTION AND
WHY DOES THIS MATTER?
In order for an organization to qualify for tax-exempt status under I.R.C.
Section 501(c)(3), it must be an organization where "no part of the net
earnings of [that organization] inures to the benefit of any private
shareholder or individual."12 Obviously this definition is open to multiple
interpretations, requiring more concrete definitions of its terms. The phrase
"private shareholder or individual" is defined in the Internal Revenue Code
("Code") as "persons having a personal and private interest in the activities
of the organization." 13 The Internal Revenue Service has defined "private
shareholder or individual" to mean "persons who, because of their particular
relationship with an organization, have an opportunity to control or
influence its activities."
14
Stated broadly, nonprofit organizations are not barred completely from
earning a profit, but are prohibited from distributing any of the profit earned
to the individuals who are in a position to exercise control over the
organization (i.e. members, directors, officers, or trustees).' This
characteristic was first referred to by Henry B. Hansmann 16 as the
"nondistribution constraint" and has led to many interesting issues regarding
nonprofit enterprises that also engage in operating for-profit businesses or
partner with such. 7
Hansmann saw the nondistribution constraint not only as the reason for
the existence of nonprofit organizations in a capitalistic society, but also as
filling a consumer confidence gap left by capitalism.is That is, where for-
profit companies, because of their endless pursuit of a more robust bottom-
line, may not provide certain services and goods, nonprofit companies will
provide such services exactly because the bottom-line is not a factor for
consideration. 9 For example, suppose that a for-profit company were in
charge of handling the disbursement of food and aid to the victims of the
12 26 U.S.C. S 501(c)(3) (2002).
13 Treas. Reg. S 1.501(a)-1(c) (as amended in 1959).
14 HILL&MANCINO,supra note 6, at 4-9 (citing to Gen. Couns. Mem. 39862 (Nov. 22, 1991)).
15 Denise Ping Lee, The BusinessJudgment Rule: Should it Protect Nonprofit Directors?, 103 COLUM.
L. REV. 925,929-30 (2003).
16 Henry B. Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835, 838 (1980).
17 For a more complete discussion of this issue, see Frances R. Hill, Targeting Exemption for
Charitable Efficiency: Designing a Nondiversion Constraint, 56 S.M.U. L. REv. 675 (2003).
18 Hansmann, supra note 16, at 843-51.
19 Id.
152 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 14:147
tsunami of December 200420 in Indonesia, Sri Lanka, and Thailand. This
for-profit company would be torn between its duty to complete the work
that it had begun in the region and the duty to the company's stockholders
to provide a profit and strong quarterly earnings. Since very few consumers
can be present to witness how much food or aid is being provided to those
in need, there is the concern that the company's pursuit of increased profits
will overtake its duty to disburse contributions. The nondistribution
constraint allows for donors or contributors who cannot be in Southeast Asia
to know that a nonprofit organization is disbursing all of the donations and
aid that it possibly can to those in need because the company is barred from
retaining any of the donations in order to make a profit. This in turn
increases the public's confidence in nonprofit organizations and provides
these organizations with their lifeblood - donations that support their
respective causes.21
While tax-exempt charities have always been prohibited from
distributing any of their assets to insiders or individuals in a position to
exercise substantial control over the organization, we must ask, who
guarantees that this does not happen? The measure of a lawful society
cannot simply be whether or not laws exist to govern certain behaviors. It
is clear that there must also be effective measures in place that enforce those
laws. After all, a law rarely enforced is a law rarely followed.
A consensus of criminologists now agree that where the goal is to deter
criminal behavior, increasing the likelihood of a criminal's apprehension is
a far more powerful deterrent than increasing the severity of punishment.
22
A nonprofit director or executive who breaches her duty of loyalty to the
company by funneling resources into her own pocket is unlikely to be
deterred from doing so if she is relatively certain that this malfeasance will
go undetected. 3  It is essential that we provide more protections for
nonprofit organizations so as to increase the public's confidence in these
necessary entities and insulate them from the reach of the unfortunate state
of human nature. To accomplish this goal, there must either be an increase
of funding for agencies already charged with charitable oversight or the
2 For an account ofthis horrible natural disaster and its afiermath, see Associated Press, Tsunami
Death Toll RisesAbove 150,000, available at http//abcnews.go.conVInternational/wireStory?id=395358 (last
visited Sept. 7, 2005).
21 See Hansmann, supra note 16, at 847.
22 John C. Coffee, Are We Really Getting Tough on White Collar Crime?, 15 FED. SENT. R. 245
(2003).
23 See Willard K Tom & Chul Pak, Toward a Flexible Rule ofReason, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 391,400
(2000).
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utilization of another set of eyes that can watch over nonprofit organizations
and protect the public's interest in charity.
There has been a tremendous increase in the number of organizations
applying for I.R.C. Section 501(c)(3) status over the last decade. 24 It is
imperative that our ability to enforce the existing regulations that govern
charities keeps pace with this rapid growth to ensure that nonprofits are
fulfilling the purposes outlined in their respective articles of incorporation.
Some commentators have proposed that the swift growth of the nonprofit
sector has caught the state legislatures unprepared and that the existing laws
are too permissive and in need of reform to bring them into conformity with
one another.
25
Once again, this article will center on the issue of standing and how an
expansion of standing in the charitable realm would serve to advance the
important goal of ensuring the fiduciary responsibility of nonprofit insiders.
It is important that these insiders do not exceed the bounds of the law in
their activities. This is essential not only for the financial well-being of the
country that relieves charitable organizations of the burden of taxation, but
also for the charitable industry as a whole. After all, a nonprofit relies on the
public's confidence that the money donated to that organization will be used
in a way that is consistent with the organization's stated purpose. The
existence and subsequent exposure of scandals, such as the well-publicized
Adelphi University fiasco 26 and the diversion of funds by United Way's
President, William Aramony,2 only serve to erode public confidence in the
administration of charitable organizations and make donations less likely.
2
This article will now focus on the two largest categories of tax-exempt
organizations, public charities and private foundations. It will outline the
structure of these organizations and examine the existing regulations that
serve to ensure the fiduciary responsibility of those in positions of power
within those organizations.
24 Tax-exempt nonprofits organized under section 501 (c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code
increased by 58.2% between 1989 and 1998 - far exceeding the growth rate of for-profit corporations
over the same span. Lee, supra note 15, at 929.
25 Lee, supra note 15, at 932.
26 SeeJAMESJ. FISHMAN & STEPHEN SCHWARZ, NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS 9-18 (1995 &
Supp. 1998).
27 HarveyJ. Goldschmid, The Fiduciary Duties ofNonprofitDirectors and Offtcers: Paradoxes, Problems,
and Proposed Refornms, 23J. CORP. L. 631,633-35 (1998).
28 Mary Grace Blasko, Curt S. Crossley & David Lloyd, Standing to Sue in the Charitable Sector,
28 U.S.F. L. REV. 37,39 (1993) [hereinafter Blasko].
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PART III: PUBLIC CHARITIES V. PRIVATE FOUNDATIONS
Both public charities and private foundations are tax-exempt
organizations under Internal Revenue Code Section 501(c) (3) .29 In fact, all
charitable entities are assumed to be private foundations unless they fall
within one of the following four categories listed in Section 509(a) of the
Internal Revenue Code:
30
1. Organizations such as churches, schools, hospitals, governmental
units and organizations supported by the general public and
government (e.g., the American Red Cross).
2. Organizations that receive more than one-third of their support
from gifts, grants, membership fees and admissions and less than
one-third of their support from investment income (e.g. museums).
3. Organizations classified as public charities because their purpose is
to support other public charities.
4. Organizations formed for the purpose of testing for public safety.
31
A. An Overview of Private Foundations
Until 1950, the law made no distinction between private foundations
and public charities.32 However, in 1950, Congress recognized the need for
more strict regulation of tax-exempt charities and enacted laws that listed
prohibited transactions for tax-exempt organizations that, if engaged in,
would result in revocation of the organization's tax-exempt status.33 The
organizations that are now listed in Section 509(a) as public charities34 were
exempt from these prohibitions because it was generally thought that these
organizations were "not believed likely to become involved in any of these
prohibited transactions."3' This sentiment has shifted however, and today
public charities are governed by limitations on prohibited transactions.
36
29 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (2002).
30 26 U.S.C S509(a) (2002). Seealso Gail D. Neuharth,A Primer on Private Foundations, 12-DEC
PROB. & PROP. 33,34 (1998).
31 26 U.S.C S 509(a) (2002).
32 HILL & MANCINO, supra note 6, at 8-4.
33 See also id. (explaining 1939 Code Sections 3813 and 3814, which later became 1954 Code
Sections 503 and 504).
3 Churches, educational organizations, hospitals, and publicly supported organizations. See S
501(c)(3), supra note 29 and accompanying text.
35 HILL & MANCINO, supra note 6, at 8-4 n.3 (quoting from S. Rep. No. 2375, 81st Cong., 2d
Sess., 1950-2 CB 483, 511).
36 See infra Part III.C.
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Private foundations are typically created by a large endowment from
either a wealthy individual or a corporation, and then funded by returns on
investments of the organization. 37 Lack of reliance on public support and the
fact that many private foundations remained under the control of their
creators soon led to criticisms that these organizations were nothing more
that a vehicle for the wealthy to be insulated from the burden of taxation
under the guise of philanthropy. In response to these public concerns,
Congress enacted the Tax Reform Act of 1969 in an attempt to limit the
abuses within such organizations. 38  The Act imposed an excise tax on
private foundations that participated in any of certain prohibited activities
that Congress determined were the most susceptible to abuse.39
B. Self-Dealing and I.R.C. Section 4941
As a result of Congress's perception of private foundations as difficult to
monitor, the Tax Reform Act of 1969 sought to completely prohibit any
direct or indirect transactions, which are known as acts of self-dealing,4°
between a private foundation and disqualified persons41 or foundation
managers. 42  The Code section that specifically addresses self-dealing,
Section 4941, makes no distinction between a transaction that is "fair" or in
the "best interests" of the private foundation and a transaction in which a
disqualified person benefits from the transaction. 43 In other words, a
37 David G. Samuels, The Regulation of Private Foundations, 217 N.Y.L.J. 1, 1 (1997).
38 Degaudenzi, supra note 11, at 214-15. See also, HILL & MANCINO, supra note 6, at 10-3
(describing the purpose and effect of the Tax Reform Act of 1969).
39 This article will focus primarily on the prohibition of self-dealing and how it impacts
nonprofit organizations. For a more complete listing of the prohibited transactions that apply only to
private foundations, see generally 26 U.S.C. S 4940 - § 4945.
40 I.R.C S 4941(d)(1) lists acts of self-dealing as between a disqualified person and a private
foundation which includes any direct or indirect (A) sale or exchange, or leasing, ofproperty; (B) lending
of money or other extension of credit; (C) furnishing of goods, services, or facilities; (D) payment of
compensation that is unreasonable; (E) transfer to, or use by or for the benefit of, a disqualified person
of the income or assets of a private foundation; or (F) agreement by a private foundation to make any
payment of money or other property to a government official. I.R.C S 4941(d)(1)(A) (2002).
41 A disqualified person is defined in I.R.C. S 4946 as any of the following: (1) a substantial
contributor, defined as one who contributes more than $5,000 to the foundation; (2) a foundation
manager, defined as an officer director or trustee of the foundation or any individual with powers and
responsibilities similar to those persons; (3) one who owns more than 20% of the voting power of a
corporation; (4) a family member of any ofthe persons listed in 1-3 above; (5) a corporation, partnership,
trust or estate in which persons named in 1-4 above own more than 35% of the voting power, profits,
or interest; (6) a private foundation effectively controlled by the same person(s) who control the private
foundation; and (7) a government official as defined in I.R.C. S 4946(c). I.R.C. S 4946(a)(1) (2002).
42 HILL & MANCINO, supra note 6, at 10-3.
43 I.R.C S 4941 (2002).
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disqualified person may not claim ignorance or propound that the
questioned transaction was actually beneficial to the foundation as a defense
to accusations of self-dealing. This new and elaborate regulatory regime
established for private foundations in 1969 was groundbreaking in that it
provided for penalties that could be assessed directly against the self-dealing
disqualified person.44  This allowed the government to punish the
wrongdoer without having to punish the charity as a whole, which could
have the unintended consequence of punishing the charity's beneficiaries.
In summary, I.R.C. Section 4941 imposes a high standard of fiduciary
responsibility on any private foundation director or manager, or any other
disqualified person. Excise taxes may be levied upon any individual who
engages in a prohibited transaction regardless of the ignorance or subjective
belief of the self-dealing disqualified person.45 However, this standard is not
applied to other tax-exempt organizations, namely public charities.
46
C. An Overview of Public Charities
An organization is classified as a public charity, rather than a private
foundation, when it falls into one of the four categories of organizations
listed in I.R.C. Section 509(a). 47 In general, public charities were not as
strictly regulated as private foundations because they derived a significant
amount of financial support from the public.48 As a result, it was thought
that they would be more accountable to the public and not require the strict
oversight applied to private foundations.49
There are many reasons that a nonprofit organization would want to
achieve public charity status instead of the default private foundation status,
not the least of which is that all public charities are exempt from the more
rigid regulations that are imposed on private foundations in Chapter 42 of
the Code. ° The most interesting of these for purposes of this discussion is




46 See infra Part III.C.
47 See Neuharth, supra note 30, at 34.
4s Degaudenzi, supra note 11, at 217.
49 Id.
50 I.R.C. S 4940 - S 4945 (2002). Restrictions that will not be discussed in this article are
minimum distributions, excess business holdings, jeopardy investment, and taxable expenditure
provisions. For a more in-depth discussion of these topics, see HILL & MANCINO, supra note 6, at
Chapters 10-12.51 I.R.C. S 4941 (2002).
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Until 1996, public charities were immune from any sanctions by the
Internal Revenue Service other than complete revocation of tax-exempt
status. 2 When Congress realized that this was too harsh a punishment
because it served to vilify and destroy the public charity rather than
punishing the individual who had engaged in the inappropriate self-dealing,
a new piece of legislation was passed to cure the problem. 3 Internal
Revenue Code Section 4958 was enacted in 1996 and provided for "inter-
mediate sanctions" that would impose excise taxes on insiders who engaged
in transactions that resulted in "excess benefits" to the insiders.-
4
D. The Limits of LR.C. Section 4958
The regulations suggest a procedure whereby the organization can
rely on a rebuttable presumption that the transaction is not an excess
benefit transaction if: (1) its terms were approved by a board or
board committee composed of individuals who have no conflict of
interest; (2) disinterested board members relied upon comparable
data; and (3) the board "adequately documented the basis for its
determination."
5
As James Fishman correctly notes above, Section 4958 differs markedly
from its counterpart rule dealing with private foundations, Section 4941.
That is, while disqualified persons in private foundations are strictly pro-
hibited from engaging in any of certain transactions with the organization,
their counterparts that run public charities may engage in the same
transactions so long as the transaction is approved by a disinterested board.
But how disinterested do we want members of the boards of charities to be?
PART IV: NONPROFIT V. FOR-PROFIT-IDENTICAL OR
FRATERNAL TWINS?
A. The Business Judgment Rule
The mistaken analogy upon which much of the problem of enforcement
in the charitable realm relies is that nonprofit corporations (public charities)
are similar to for-profit corporations. While it is true that the two are similar
52 Gary, supra note 9, at 632.
53 See Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2, Pub. L. No. 104-168, S 4958, 110 Stat. 1452, 1475-78 (1996).
S4 Gary, supra note 9, at 632-33. 26 U.S.C. S 4958 (1996).
55 James J. Fishman, Improving Charitable Accountability, 62 MD. L. REv. 218,254 (2003).
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in structure, the application of the business judgment rule to nonprofit
directors is a perfect example of the old maxim that for every complex
question there is an answer that is simple, elegant, and wrong.5 6 The
business judgement rule is a suit that just does not fit the executives of
nonprofits.
The business judgment rule as applied in the for-profit realm allows
those individuals who are in positions of power within the corporation to
make decisions without being second-guessed by shareholders or the
judiciary.5 7 Any action of an executive of a for-profit company will be
protected if the decision was made: (1) in good faith and without a conflict
of interest; (2) on a reasonably informed basis; and (3) with a rational belief
(connoting broad discretion and wide latitude) that the business decision is
in the best interests of the corporationsi
The problem with the business judgment rule as applied to public
charities is not the standard itself, but the fact that enforcement procedures
that are available to assure stockholders that the directors of for-profit
companies adhere to this standard are lacking in the nonprofit arena. 9 In
the for-profit world, boards of directors and shareholders act as a check
upon directors or chief executive officers of corporations that would seek to
line their own pockets at the expense of the company. Boards and
executives of for-profit companies are elected by the shareholders of that
company and entrusted with running the company in a profitable manner.
I.R.C Section 4958, as it applies to public charities, assumes that the boards
and members of nonprofit corporations will act in the same manner to
prevent any breach of fiduciary duty or misappropriation of funds by charity
directors, but as we shall see, this is not necessarily the case. 6°
B. Nonprofit Boards
The boards of directors of public charities are not analogous to their for-
profit counterparts as effective checks upon motivated and overbearing
nonprofit executives for many reasons. First of all, for-profit boards are
elected by shareholders and well compensated to be independent when
reviewing decisions that are purportedly in the best interests of the
56 Mark A. Hall & John D. Colombo, The Charitable Status of Nonprofit Hospitals: Toward a
Donative Theory of Tax Exemption, 66 WASH. L. REV 307, 330 n.76 (1991) (quoting H.L. Mencken).
57 Lee, supra note 15, at 945, 955.
58 Goldschmid, supra note 27, at 643-44.
59 For an extensive discussion ofwhy the underlying purposes ofthe businessjudgment rule are
inapplicable to nonprofit organizations, see Lee, supra note 15.
60 See infra Part IV.C-D.
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corporation. 61 In contrast, boards of nonprofit corporations are frequently
self-perpetuating, which means that the directors are not subject to election
and their terms are potentially of infinite duration.62 As a result, these board
members are likely to feel less responsibility for their actions since they are
not accountable to a group of persons analogous to the shareholders of a for-
profit company. Incompetent directors will also be difficult, if not
impossible, to remove for the same reason.., lack of accountability. 3
Secondly, boards of nonprofits are also typically larger than their for-
profit counterparts and are not usually compensated for their time.' Many
members of nonprofit boards have jobs as executives in the for-profit world
and serve on nonprofit boards as a status symbol rather than out ofa genuine
desire to further the goals of the charity.65 As a result, they are often
uninvolved, rarely attend meetings, and almost never concern themselves
with oversight responsibilities.66 The danger of larger boards, in addition to
a lack of accountability, flows from two separate but closely related social
psychological concepts called diffusion of responsibility and
deindividuation.67
The core principle of diffusion of responsibility is that people are more
likely to acquiesce to the will of the group or just "go along" instead of
asserting their individual thoughts or feelings in situations where there is a
lack of individual accountability. 68 Generally, subjects in experiments
designed to study this concept have said that they failed to voice their
concerns or act when in a large group because they assumed that if a
problem existed, someone else would take care of it.69 Deindividuation is a
related concept that was first studied by Festinger, Pepitone and Newcomb
in 195270 and deals with the phenomenon that individuals who are in a large
group tend to lose their personal identities and do things that are
inconsistent with their self-identified personalities. Larger groups, ofwhich
an individual is a part, give that individual anonymity and also allow them
61 Lee, supra note 15, at 950.
62 Id. at 932.
63 Id. at 950.
64 Id. at 950-51.
65 Goldschmid, supra note 27, at 633.
66 Id.
67 See Social Influence - Diffusion of Responsibility, http://www.cultsock.ndirect.co.uk/MUHome/
cshtmVsocinf/diffusion.html (last visited Sept. 7, 2005).
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 L. Festinger, A. Pepitone, & T. Newcomb, Some Consequences ofDeindividuation in a Group, 47
JOURNAL OF ABNORMAL AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, 382-89 (1952).
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to share the blame, reducing the sense of individual responsibility."
Nonprofit boards that are especially large and consist of persons who have
other responsibilities and duties at for-profit companies are very likely to
allow themselves to be dominated by a motivated board member with an
agenda.
To see these social psychological concepts at work in the larger board
rooms of nonprofit entities, one need look no further than the scandal
involving United Way of America and its President, William Aramony. In
late 1991, Mr. Aramony was indicted and ultimately convicted for using
United Way funds for personal perquisites such as "limousines and
transatlantic flights on the Concorde."72 In addition, Aramony used his
position to "reward friends and family members with jobs, board
memberships, and consulting contracts.
73
The actions ofWilliam Aramony were abhorrent, but the question that
should be asked is why none of the more than 30 members of the United
Way board of directors stepped in to prevent Aramony from looting the
charity? As is the case with many nonprofit boards, many of the members
of the board of United Way were also successful businesspeople who played
large roles in the successes of their for-profit employers.7 4 These were
intelligent people who knew the difference between right and wrong and
presumably understood from their collective business experience what the
role of a board member of a company entailed. So what could explain their
lack of action and passivity when so much evidence of wrongdoing was right
at their fingertips? The Report to the Board of Governors of United Way
of America stated that the board only met only twice a year and always
approved Aramony's requests for separately incorporating United Way
functions.75 Soon after, the board subsequently lost control and supervision
over the separate corporations.76 Perhaps the members of the United Way
board simply did not pursue their responsibilities at United Way with the
same vigor that they pursued their exploits in their for-profit companies.
Or, perhaps they fell victim to diffusion of responsibility and assumed that
if a problem existed, someone else would say something, and since nobody
had complained, everything must be all right. Whatever the reason for the
71 See ChangingMinds.org, Deindividuation, http://changingminds.org/explanations/theories/
deindividuation.htm#Research (last visited Oct. 1, 2005).
72 Goldschmid,supra note 27, at 633-34 (citing THEPHILANTHROPYMONTHLY(Dec. 1991 and
Jan.-Feb. 1992)).
73 Id.
74 Id. at 634.
75 Id.
76 Id.
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shirking of their duties, a passive and complacent board can be a nightmare
to the nonprofit system that lacks the other forms of enforcement that are
present in the for-profit world.77
Consuelo Kertz challenges whether the boards of nonprofits can ever
truly be independent in the way that for-profit boards are expected to be in
order to protect the company.7 She states that "board membership often
consists of the executive's friends and cronies, and there is often
reciprocity-individuals sitting on one another's boards."79 As should be
evident, boards of nonprofit corporations are not nearly the check on
executive action as are their counterparts in the for-profit world. Nonprofit
board members who are not compensated, elected, or involved with the
charity out of a genuine desire to ensure that the organization is responsibly
run can become so disinterested that the more appropriate terms to describe
them are uninformed and complacent. Without an active board of directors
to check a motivated executive, the standard established in I.R.C. Section
4958 that a transaction is presumptively reasonable if approved by the board
of directors becomes strikingly ineffective. Where boards acquiesce in their
responsibility to monitor the activities of a director, the danger of
misappropriation grows exponentially, especially in light of the fact that
nonprofit corporations lack shareholder equivalents that would serve as a
further check on a dominant director of a public charity., °
C. Members and Derivative Suits
For-profit directors are also monitored by shareholders that have the
ability to institute shareholder derivative suits in order to sue a director on
behalf of the corporation." Charities do not have shareholders, but some
charitable corporations have members with the power to elect directors and
these members have been seen as analogous to shareholders in for-profit
77 This author is pleased to report that the Senate Finance Committee has recently published
a list of proposed reforms in the area of tax-exempt organizations. Included within these proposals was
a suggested reform of nonprofit board composition that would limit boards to "no less than three
members and no greater than fifteen." This could likely serve to increase individual accountability of
board members and, in turn, strengthen the first line of defense against misappropriation of charitable
assets. William Josephson, The Senate Finance Committee Staff Discussion Paper, 144 PL/NY 141, 155
(2004).
78 Consuelo Lauda Kertz, Executive Compensation Dilemmas in Tax-Exempt Organizations:
Reasonableness, Comparability, and Disclosure, 71 TUL. L. REv. 819, 855 (1997).
79 Id.
80 Blasko, supra note 28, at 54.
81 Rob Atkinson, Unsettled Standing: Who (Else) Should Enforce the Duties of Charitable Fiduciaries?,
23J. CoRp L. 655,670 (1998).
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corporations. 2 The analogy is not perfect, as nonprofit corporations have
the power to determine the terms on which membership is offered or
whether they will have members at all."
Denise Ping Lee also notes that even when a nonprofit corporation does
have members, those members do not have a direct financial stake in the
organization as do shareholders of for-profit companies.84 As a result, any
money that would be recovered through a lawsuit would be given back to
the nonprofit, and so a member has little incentive to sue due to her lack of
personal financial interest in that organization." While it Is certainly true
that a member who initiates a lawsuit to enforce the charitable
responsibilities of an organization does not stand to gain financially from
such an action, can it be said that financial gain is the sole motivating factor
behind a suit such as this? Often a member of a charity may want to see that
the charity continues to maintain a presence in his or her community
because it breathes life into a deteriorating neighborhood. Certainly, this has
a value all its own that cannot be measured in terms of dollars and cents.
Can we truly argue that a plaintiff who stands to receive an award of money
damages is more interested in the litigation for standing purposes than one
whose overall quality of life stands to be affected by an adverse decision of
a charity? In Young Men's Christian Association of the City of Washington v.
Covington,86 ("Y.M.C.A.") the court ruled that where a charity has
membership defined by a process that includes filling out an application,
having that application approved, and paying dues, then that member has a
"special interest"' and has standing to sue to enforce the charitable
obligations of the organization s.88 While this is certainly an encouraging
decision, the fact is that the Y.M.CA. case is the exception and not the rule
in the world of charitable organizations. Very few charities have a system
where individuals can become members through an application process that
would enable a court to view them as having an interest in the organization
beyond that of the general public.
The simple fact is that if the members in the Y.M.CA. case had not paid
dues to the organization, it is highly unlikely that they would have been
found to have an interest in the activities of the charity. So how can we
reconcile this with the fact that donors to a charity are routinely denied
82 Blasko, supra note 28, at 54.
83 Lee, supra note 15, at 934.
84 Id.
85 Id.
86 484 A.2d 589 (D.C. 1984).
s7 See discussion infra Part VI.A.
88 YM.CA., 484 A.2d at 591-92.
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standing? 9 Must the determination of standing turn on an individual
donating money to the organization and also reaping a benefit from the
same? The standard for determining standing seems at best overly
discretionary and at worst arbitrary. For purposes of this section, it suffices
to note that most charities do not have voting members who are analogous
to for-profit shareholders, even in states that would authorize such members
to bring suit to enforce the charitable obligations of the organization. 90
D. I.R. C. Section 4958 v. LR.C. Section 4941: Is There a Logical Basis for
Such a Distinction?
The intermediate sanctions codified in Section 4958 that apply to public
charities were an excellent idea and a reform that was badly needed.
However, those sanctions are useless when they exist in a system that is void
of any enforcement mechanisms that are equivalent to those in the for-profit
world. Without interested boards of directors or shareholders that will
vigorously defend the interests of the organization, who is left to ensure that
transactions between executives and the public charities that they oversee are
in fact fair? If we conclude that oversight is lacking in the nonprofit field
generally, then why is there a difference between the self-dealing regulations
applied to private foundations and those applied to public charities?
One of the more convincing arguments that public charities should not
be completely prohibited from acts of self-dealing is that smaller public
charities have a greater financial need to be able to rely on beneficial
transactions by those who would be otherwise considered insiders.9 While
private foundations are often more financially stable since they are typically
created by one significant endowment, small public charities that depend
upon public support for survival may find themselves in a situation where
an insider or disqualified person can provide real estate, goods, or services
at a cost that is below fair market value.92
Deborah DeMott favors the ability of small public charities to be free of
the strict prohibitions of private foundations, but argues that the standard of
89 See infra note 99 and accompanying text.
90 Gary, supra note 9, at 626.
91 See Goldschmid, supra note 27, at 647-48 (explaining that a complete prohibition against self-
dealing transactions for nonprofit corporations would be too inflexible and would prove both impractical
and counterproductive). Contra Henry B. Hansmann, Reforming Nonprofit Corporation Law, 129 U. PA.
L. REV. 497, 569 (1981) (arguing for a "flat prohibition against all self-dealing transactions involving
controlling persons in nonprofit organizations").
92 Gary, supra note 9, at 635; see also Deborah A. DeMott, Self-Dealing Transactions in Nonprofit
Corporations, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 131, 144 (1993).
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review is too lax.93 She proposes that a self-dealing transaction should be
voidable unless the proponent can affirmatively show that the transaction
was, in fact, fair at the time that it was completed.94 DeMott additionally
proposes that larger public charities who are at least as financially stable as
most private foundations should be subject to the strict prohibitions against
interested transactions that are found in Section 4941.' 5 This would
certainly deal with the deferential standard of judicial review of such
challenged transactions under the business judgment rule. Unfortunately,
what truly seems to be lacking in the field are the enforcement mechanisms
to prevent unfair transactions in the first place. After all, while it is
important to be able to punish a self-dealer once he or she is in court, the
charitable industry as a whole would benefit more by a system that could get
more self-dealers into court in the first place.
PART V: ENFORCEMENT PROBLEMS-WHO HAS STANDING TO SUE
IN THE CHARITABLE SECTOR?
As we have seen, charitable corporations are often compared to for-
profit companies in applying a "reasonableness" standard to determine
whether a particular transaction was an act of self-dealing. Courts have
applied the business judgment rule to directors of nonprofits even though
so many of the market restraints on for-profit companies are lacking in the
charitable sector (i.e. interested boards of directors, shareholders, etc.). 96 In
the absence of such safeguards acting as a check on a director's power, how
can we be sure that nonprofit corporations are functioning efficiently and
using charitable donations in a manner consistent with the organization's
stated purpose? The answer is that we cannot, and where internal measures
to assure compliance with the law are lacking, as is the case with nonprofit
corporations, external enforcement measures must be relied upon to protect
the public's interest in charity.
In this section, we will first briefly examine the doctrine of standing and
how this judicially-created doctrine serves to sharply limit those who may
bring an action for breach of fiduciary duty against a charity or a charitable
director or executive. Next, we will take a closer look at those parties who
are generally entrusted with the responsibility of bringing an action to
93 DeMott, supra note 92, at 143.
94 Id.
95 Id.
96 For some decisions by courts applying the corporate business judgment rule standard to
directors of nonprofits, see Stem v. Lucy Webb Hayes Nat'l Training Sch. For Deaconesses and Missionaries,
381 F. Supp. 1003 (D.D.C. 1974); and Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y. 2d 619 (1979).
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enforce the charitable fiduciary responsibilities of a nonprofit. It will
become evident that there are significant problems with relying on these
parties to oversee the quickly increasing number of charitable entities in this
country. Budgetary restraints have tied the hands of governmental entities
charged with the oversight of nonprofits and the enforcement of charitable
laws, and action needs to be taken to supplement the efforts of these
overburdened oversight entities.
A. "hat is Standing and Wy Does it Exist? A Brief Overview
Thejudicially created concept of standing is built around the singularly
important Constitutional notion of separation of powers. 97 The judicial
power of the United States after Marbury v. Madison9" was seemingly
limitless, and standing doctrine ensures that the judiciary does not intrude
upon or second guess the policy making roles of the representative branches
of the government. The doctrine embraces several judicially self-imposed
limitations on a court's ability to reach judgment in certain cases.99 Such
limitations include: (1) a general prohibition on a litigant's raising another
person's legal rights; (2) a rule barring adjudication of generalized grievances
that should be addressed to the representative branches of government; and
(3) a requirement that a plaintiff's complaint fall within the zone of interests
protected by the law invoked." "In essence the question of standing is
whether the litigant is entitled to have the court decide the merits of the
dispute or of particular issues."' 01 Justice Scalia summarized the three
elements necessary for a particular plaintiff to have standing as:
1) The plaintiff must have suffered an "injury in fact"- an invasion
of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and
particularized, and (b) "actual or imminent, not 'conjectural' or
'hypothetical."'
2) There must be a causal connection between the injury and the
conduct complained of-the injury has to be "fairly...traceable
to the challenged action of the defendant, and not...the result
[of] the independent action of some third party not before the
court."
97 Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984).
98 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
99 Allen, 468 U.S. at 751.
100 Id.
101 Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975).
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3) It must be "likely," as opposed to merely "speculative," that the
injury will be "redressed by a favorable decision."
10 2
For the purposes of our discussion, the "injury in fact" requirement is
the most interesting.0 3 Very few citizens are recognized by courts as having
such a personal interest in a charitable organization that any malfeasance by
that organization would give rise to an injury in fact and consequently,
standing. Even donors and beneficiaries, who are more closely tied to and
interested in the charitable organization than are members of the general
public, have been denied standing to sue" unless they can demonstrate that
they have a "special interest" in the charity. 05 In addition, statutory
construction of various states' nonprofit corporation acts by courts have led
to peculiar results in various cases. For instance, at least one court has ruled
that ousted minority directors of a nonprofit may not sue on behalf of the
charity to enforce the fiduciary responsibilities of charitable executives.'16
The restriction of standing doctrine in the area of enforcing the fiduciary
duties of charity insiders has been justified as serving the purpose of
protecting the charities from "vexatious litigation" that could occur if
members of the general public were granted the ability to act as champions
of the public good.10 7 The general idea is that if charities or their directors
were subject to suits by the general public, then charitable resources that
were intended to further the mission of the organization would be diverted
to defend those actions.108 But is this the case? Would the virtual floodgates
102 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992).
103 For a discussion of the evolution of standing doctrine and the requirement of an "injury in
fact", see Kristen M. Shults, Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Environmental Services: A Resounding Victory for
Environmentalists, its Implication on Future Justiciability Decisions, and Resolution of Issues on Remand, 89 GEO.
L.J. 1001, 1008-11 (2001).
104 CarlJ. Herzog Found., Inc. v. Univ. of Bridgeport, 699 A.2d 995 (Conn. 1997) (stating that
a donor may not institute an action against a donee to force the use of the funds as was agreed. Only the
Attorney General has standing to enforce the restriction on the gift); Russell v. Yale Univ., 737 A.2d 941,
946 (Conn. App. Ct. 1999) (holding that alumni of the university lack standing as donors of unrestricted
charitable gifts to their alma mater). Contra In re Milton Hershey Sch., 867 A.2d 674, 689-691 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 2005) (holding that members of alumni association of charitable school had a special
interest in the school and so had standing to seek rescission of an agreement between the Office of the
Attorney General and the charitable trust company); In re Estate of Smithers, 760 N.Y.S.2d 304 (N.Y.
Sur. Ct. 2003) (holding that the widow of a deceased donor had standing to enforce the terms of the
charitable gift to a hospital).
105 See discussion infra Part VI.A.
106 See infra Part V.D.
107 Hooker v. Edes Home, 579 A.2d 608, 612 (D.C. Ct. App. 1990).
108 Blasko, supra note 28, at 42 (recounting a telephone conversation with Catherine Wells, Prof.
of Law, University of Southern California, Former Member, Nat'l Comm. of Charity Info. Officers
(Jan. 15, 1992)).
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of litigation be opened such that litigation would drown the effective
functioning of charitable entities in our country if standing were expanded?
Or could the result be somewhat less chaotic and perhaps even beneficial to
the country and the charitable industry? We will revisit this question after
outlining those who are today recognized by the courts as having standing
to bring an action to enforce the fiduciary duties of a charitable
organization. 0 9
B. Just Who Does Have Standing to Sue in the Charitable Sector?
Standing doctrine in the nonprofit arena have led nonprofit fiduciary
duties to be referred to as "legal obligation[s] without legal sanction[s]."'10
So whose job is it to protect the public's interest in charity? There are
generally three groups or agencies that have been consistently granted
standing to sue a self-dealing director of a charity: (1) the Internal Revenue
Service; (2) other board members who question the appropriateness of the
actions of a dominant director; and most importantly (3) states' attorneys
general.
This section will review each of these groups and discuss whether these
groups are a sufficient means of enforcement, either alone or in conjunction,
for assuring that nonprofit boards and directors are fulfilling their fiduciary
duties to the public. In Part VI, we will discuss how courts have begun to
retreat from rigid application of the doctrine of standing when a plaintiff has
a "special interest" in the charitable organization and just what classes of
individuals have been identified by courts as having such an interest. This
article then argues that a further expansion of standing through legislation
could serve to better assure compliance with existing regulations by making
prosecution of charitable executives who violate their fiduciary duties more
certain.
C. The Internal Revenue Service
We have previously discussed I.R.C. Section 4941 and Section 4958, two
of the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") regulations that serve to define the
boundaries within which fiduciaries of both private foundations and public
charities may act."' Traditionally, states' attorneys general have been the
109 For a discussion of the implications of expanding standing in the charitable sector, see infra Part
VI.B.1-D.
110 Evelyn Brody, Agents Without Principals: The Economic Convergence of the Nonproft and For-Profit
Organizational Forms, 40 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 457,465-66 (1996).
ill See supra notes 40-44, 55, 91-95 and accompanying text.
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primary protectors of the public's interest in charity and, as such, are
responsible for oversight of nonprofit organizations.'12 However, due to a
lack of resources at the disposal of attorneys general," 3 the IRS has become
the primary regulator of nonprofit behavior.1 4 In this section, we will
outline the steps taken by the IRS to ensure that nonprofit entities in this
country are complying with the law. The possibility of reform to the
existing charitable oversight system of the IRS and criticisms of such reforms
are analyzed in an attempt to strike a balance between forcing compliance
with existing regulations while avoiding the imposition of too many
administrative requirements on smaller nonprofits with limited resources.
1. FoRM 990s
Every organization that has gross receipts exceeding $25,000 and is
exempt from federal income tax must file an information return called a
Form 990 each year with the IRS."' Congress recently imposed a require-
ment that an organization must provide its Form 990s for the most recent
three years upon request by any member of the public who wishes to inspect
them."6 The motivation behind this Congressional action was that
increased accessibility to nonprofit tax returns would increase compliance
with existing IRS regulations governing those entities." 7 It is difficult to say
if members of the public have taken advantage of the opportunity to review
the 990s of nonprofit entities over the last nine years. What is certain is that
if the public does not inspect these forms, it is unlikely that the IRS will be
able to do so either.
The IRS' Form 990s reveal limited, but important information about the
nonprofits who file with the IRS." 8 Unfortunately, very few of the Form
990s are actually reviewed due to the declining ratio of IRS staff to nonprofit
entities applying for tax-exempt status each year." 9
112 John Vinson, The Charity Oversight Authority of the Texas Attorney General, 35 ST. MARY'S L.J.
243, 244-45 (2004).
113 See discussion infra Part V.E.
114 U.S. Gov. Accountability Office, Report No. GAO-02-526, Tax-Exempt Organizations:
Improvements Possible in Public, IRS, and State Oversight of Charities (2002) [hereinafter GAO Report].
115 See Treas. Reg. S 1.6033-2 (as amended in 1995).
116 See Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2, Pub. L. No. 104-168, 110 Stat. 1452 (1996) (July 30, 1996).
117 See id.
118 John F. Coverdale, Preventing Insider Misappropriation of Not-For-Profit Health Care Provider
Assets: A Federal Tax Law Prescription, 73 WASH. L. REV. 1, 15 (1998).
119 Id.
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For instance, in the year 2001, 58,938 applications were received
requesting that the entity receive tax-exempt status under 501 (c) (3).
Of those 10,548 were disposed of because the applicant did not
submit a fee, did not submit all documents, or the application was
withdrawn. Of the 42,366 complete applications submitted, only 58
were denied! From 1996 through 2001, the number of Form 990
annual returns filed with the Service increased by twenty-five
percent (286,000) while the number examined dropped fifteen
percent (to 1237). The percentage of charities examined annually
has fallen from .73 in 1998 to .43 in 2001. The reasons for the
decline are: changing Service priorities for other taxpayers, declining
resources, and shifting of agents from examinations to cope with the
increased number of applications. 20
As we have seen, the Form 990 was intended to increase the public's
access to nonprofit financial records and the accountability of the
organizations that file these informational returns. Yet, it is becoming
apparent that the IRS is ill-equipped to handle the sheer volume of 990s that
must be reviewed each year. The danger of the public perceiving IRS review
as a rubber-stamp to nonprofit entities is very real and has the potential to
negatively affect charitable contributions if the public ultimately concludes
that a lack of governmental oversight may lead to misconduct that could go
undiscovered.
A. INCREASED FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE BY PUBLIC CHARITIES
One question that we should ask with regard to the Form 990s is, if
there were sufficient numbers of IRS employees to review all of the 990s,
would that solve the problem? Many commentators have suggested that the
problem with the Form 990s lies not simply in the fact that they are scantily
reviewed, but also in the fact that even if reviewed, the 990s would not be
useful because charities often misrepresent information, or worse, fail to
provide the required information at all.121
This is not to suggest that where errors appear on Form 990s, they are
always indicative of charities intentionally misleading the government and
the public because they have something to hide. On the contrary, a lack of
120 Fishman, supra note 55, at 265-66 (summarizing findings listed in GAO Report, supra note
109, at 20-23).
121 Degaudenzi, supra note 11, at 221.
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conformity in accounting standards between organizations contributes to
different charities using different methods of calculations when accounting
for expenses.'22 This flexibility in accounting methods has led to charities
erroneously reporting fundraising and general expenses as program expenses
on their Form 990s.I" Whether such errors are innocent mistakes because
the organization is small and ill-equipped to handle complex accounting
issues, or the errors are intentional and an attempt to make the charity
appear more efficient in an age of more accessible tax returns, the problem
is equally grave. The Form 990 is an all too brief statement of information
that is compiled by a variety of differing methods. This makes it very
difficult to decipher these forms and discover any questionable accounting
or out-and-out fraud by the organization.
In response to a report issued by the General Accounting Office to
Congress, which highlighted the fact that similarly situated charities can file
very different Form 990s due to the previously mentioned problems,'24 the
Senate Finance Committee has proposed Sarbanes-Oxley 25 type legislation
for nonprofit entities. 26 The proposed reforms would: (1) require enhanced
and itemized disclosure on annual 990s;127 (2) require the signature of the
charity's chief executive officer under penalty of perjury that the
organization put in place processes that will ensure that the organization's
tax return complies with the mandates of the IRS and is both accurate and
complete; 12 and (3) promulgate standards for the filing of Form 990s and
increase penalties for failure to timely file in accordance with such
standards.'29 Certainly these reforms will serve to provide more information
about nonprofit entities to both the IRS and to the public for review, but are
they the answer? Will these Sarbanes-Oxley type reforms serve to increase
compliance with the existing regulations of charitable organizations, or like
the businessjudgment rule, are they a for-profit solution that does not easily
translate to a nonprofit problem? As is always the case in life, the critics are
not at a loss for words.
122 Kertz, supra note 78, at 861-62.
123 Id. (citing a report by Baruch College). See also Gary, supra note 9, at 641.
124 GAO Report, supra note 109.
125 Sarbanes-OxleyAct of2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 15, 18 U.S.C.).
126 Josephson, supra note 77, at 149-53.
127 Id. at 152.
128 Id. at 150.
129 Id. at 150-51.
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B. POTENTIAL SIDE-EFFECTS OF PROPOSED DISCLOSuRE REFORMS
Critics of the disclosure and accountability reforms proposed by the
Senate Finance Committee note that these changes will likely increase
operating costs of charities which will cause the charity to appear less
efficient. 3 ' In addition, it may dissuade competent and talented individuals
from pursuing a career in the nonprofit sector due to a simple application of
cost/benefit analysis.' 3 '
We must remember that in deciding to whom to donate funds,
contributors often look to an organization's annual report to get an
indication of what percentage of funds are used for the organizations stated
purpose. 132 Enacting reforms that increase the operating costs of charitable
organizations may have the unintended effect of making it more difficult for
charities to obtain significant donations because contributors may feel that
their money is not being directed to the purpose for which they intended. 
133
There is yet another serious problem to be considered when increasing the
operating costs of charities; while many large charities will be able to easily
bear the costs of such a change, the majority of charities in this country are
not on par with the Red Cross'3 4 and have very small amounts of both
human and monetary resources. Increasing the amount of paperwork and
administrative duties of nonprofits may have a disproportionate impact on
smaller charities, which will cut what the staffs of such organizations could
accomplish in charity work.
131
Imposing reforms that will provide for criminal liability for directors and
board members may also have the effect of diverting competent individuals
from the nonprofit sector to the for-profit sector. 136 For-profit executives
are much more generously compensated than are executives and directors
who have chosen to work in the charitable sector. 137 Most executives of
130 Wendy K. Szymanski,AnAllegory ofGood(andBad) Governance:Applying the Sarbanes-OxleyAct
to Nonprofit Organizations, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 1303, 1319 (2003).
131 Id. at 1316-17.
132 Id. at 1319-20. See also www.give.org.
133 Id.
134 More than a million Red Cross volunteers and 35,000 employees annually mobilize relief to
families affected by more than 70,000 disasters. See http://www.redcross.org/aboutus (last visited
September 17, 2005).
13 Steven Renaldi, Too Many New Reporting Rules Could Hurt Michigan Nonprofits, The Detroit
News, Sep. 17, 2004, available at 2004 WLNR 16230314.
136 David W. BarrettA CallforMore Lenient Director Liability Standardsfor Small Charitable Nonprofit
Corporations, 71 IND. L.J. 967,970 (1996).
137 Id.
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nonprofits are hired for their extensive knowledge of the field and not for
their financial prowess or accounting skills. 13 Adding more responsibility
and the possibility of criminal liability to an already underpaid position (as
compared to their for-profit counterparts) is only likely to convince qualified
candidates for charitable executive positions to pursue other opportunities.
Where these candidates engage in any sort of cost-benefit analysis, they will
be led to the inexorable conclusion that they would be better off in the for-
profit world where the compensation is more reflective of the liability and
effort of the job.
139
While some accountability and disclosure reform is certainly necessary
in the nonprofit sector, it would be dangerous to be too hasty in importing
for-profit solutions such as Sarbanes-Oxley type legislation to the nonprofit
field without considering all of the possible negative implications of such
action. Criminal liability for nonprofit executives and directors goes too far
and could, in the long run, cause charitable organizations to be less
productive due to less qualified individuals being at the helm of such
entities. Additionally, there are very few rules and regulations in any field
that apply across the board. While increased disclosure and accountability
is a necessary reform, more thought needs to be devoted as to how such
regulations could be applied even-handedly so that smaller nonprofits are
not spending a larger percentage of their overhead on administrative tasks.
Such a result would only cause a public perception of inefficiency and a
possible reduction in donations. In addition to disclosure and accountability
requirements, the IRS has also provided penalties that can be assessed
directly against a self-dealing charity executive in order to avoid punishing
the organization as a whole.' 4°
2. INTERMEDIATE SANCTIONS
Earlier sections of this article discussed Congress' attempt to punish
wrongdoers at the heads of public charities without also having to punish the
organization itself and the beneficiaries of that organization's mission.
141
The intermediate sanctions legislation passed by Congress in 1996 does
have bite when applied to a disqualified person who participates in an excess
138 Renaldi, supra note 135.
139 Szymanski, supra note 130, at 1317.
140 26 U.S.C. S 4958.
141 See discussion supra Parts Ill.C-D, IV.D.
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benefit transaction, 142 but just how often is Section 4958 enforced against
charitable fiduciaries?
In the first seven years of the existence of intermediate sanctions
through Section 4958, the insiders of only two organizations had taxes
imposed upon them under that legislation. 43 Does this suggest that public
charity insiders are conforming to the demands of the law or that there are
enforcement problems with I.R.C. Section 4958 that are not present with its
private foundation counterpart, I.R.C. Section 4941? The idealist smiles at
the former, while the realist acknowledges the latter. The inherent problem
in dealing with these two pieces of legislation as equals is that Congress has
chosen to deal with public charities and private foundations in two very
different ways.'44
I.R.C. Section 4941 is a blanket prohibition on all transactions by any
private foundation insider with his or her organization.4 ' This provides
objective, and easily identifiable behavior that, if engaged in, will subject the
insider to intermediate sanctions. 4 6 Legislation with this type of objective
criteria can be seen as self-executing in that a few largely publicized cases
will be sufficient to bring the rest of the industry into compliance. 4 7 This
is a reasonable assumption given the ease with which violations of Section
4941 can be identified. After all, a transaction either took place or it did not,
there is no reasonableness standard against which to measure the actions of
an insider of a private foundation. Some commentators have argued that
Section 4958, as applied to public charities, will be self-executing in the same
way, 4 8 but their analysis of the situation seems to have omitted the problem
of proof.
Unlike the rigid but objective transactional rules for private foundations,
Section 4958 imposes a reasonableness standard into the equation. 149 In
142 Coverdale, supra note 118, at 13-14.
An excess benefit transaction triggers an initial tax on the disqualified person equal to twenty-
five percent of the excess benefit.... By the earlier date on which a notice of deficiency with
respect to the initial tax is mailed or the initial tax is assessed, the excess benefit transaction
must be 'corrected.' If not corrected within that time, a tax equal to two hundred percent of
the excess benefit is imposed on the disqualified person.
Id.
143 Fishman, supra note 55, at 267 (referring to the Bishop Estate in Hawaii and a medical
organization in Mississippi where family members and directors had to return $5.2 million in assets).
144 See discussion supra Part III.D.
145 26 U.S.C. S 4941.
146 Id.
147 Coverdale, supra note 118, at 14.
148 BRUCE R. HOPKINS & D. BENSON TESDAHL, INTERMEDIATE SANCTIONS: CURBING
NONPROFIT ABUSE 44 (1997).
149 See discussion supra Part III.D.
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other words, an insider of a public charity is only subjected to intermediate
sanctions when it can be shown that the transaction in question was not
reasonably fair, taking into account the particular facts and circumstances.
50
John Coverdale argues that the reasonableness standard militates strongly
against Section 4958 being self-executing in the same manner as Section
4941 because it is "notoriously difficult to determine fair-market value in
complex transactions involving multiple assets, including intangibles such
as goodwill and going concern value."' 5' As such, it is less likely that Section
4958 will force compliance with its demands in the absence of some real
threat and presence of a viable system ofenforcement. Unfortunately, as we
have seen, the IRS' budget is failing to even keep pace with inflation, to say
nothing of the rapid growth of nonprofit entities that are applying for tax-
exempt status each spring. 152 It seems apparent that, at least as far as Section
4958 and the Internal Revenue Service are concerned, the urgent need in
this area of law is for assistance in the realm of enforcement and not more
regulation. So if the IRS is failing to keep up with the rapid growth of
nonprofit entities in this country and is having difficulty enforcing its
regulations, then who else is left with standing to enforce the duties of
charitable fiduciaries?
D. Members of the Board
Any member of the board of a nonprofit entity has standing to bring suit
on behalf of the entity against another director who has breached his
fiduciary obligation to the charity.'53 Our discussion has already reviewed
in some detail how nonprofit boards are ill suited to act as checks on the
actions of dominant directors or executives.' 4 However, there is another
piece of the puzzle that should be examined. *Whether or not a director or
board member has standing to sue on behalf of the nonprofit corporation for
the actions of a self-interested executive or director is often a question of
statutory interpretation by the courts.155 This can result in rather bizarre
ISO See discussion supra Part III.D.
151 Coverdale, supra note 118, at 14.
152 Fishman, supra note 55, at 265-66.
153 Id. at 258.
1 See discussion supra Part IV.A-B.
15 See Lundberg v. Coleman, 60 P.3d 595, 598-99 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002) (stating that the
Washington Legislature has granted shareholders of for-profit companies the right to bring derivative
actions on behalf of the corporation. The fact that that same Legislature did not adopt the section of the
Revised Model Nonprofit Corporation Act that would grant members and directors of nonprofits
standing to bring derivative suits indicates its intent to reject such a provision or right).
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outcomes, such as in the case of Morris v. Thomas.15 6 In Morris, the court
stated that a plain reading of the North Carolina Nonprofit Corporation Act
required that two ousted members of a charity's board of directors be denied
standing because they did not institute the derivative action while they were
still members of the board. 5 7 This would seem to allow a situation where
board members could conspire to oust other members in a sort of nonprofit
hostile takeover. On its face, this ruling seems to further weaken our faith
in the ability of boards of directors to ensure that charitable obligations are
being fulfilled. After all, if dissenting board members can simply be ousted
and replaced when they refuse to go along with the will of the majority, then
how strong will they be willing to fight against a course of action that they
feel is not in the best interests of the charity?
A quick review of the implications of the Morris decision will lead to the
conclusion that something in the system broke down. As a point of review,
it seems to be agreed that we want boards of directors to review suggested
courses of action of the organization to be sure that those actions are in the
charity's best interests. However, if a member of the board objects to a
course of action as not in the best interests of the charity, then he or she can
be ousted and replaced by the other self-interested board members. If the
ousted board member then files a derivative action on behalf of the charity
the next day, or even later that same day, the result is that he or she will be
denied standing because they were not on the board when the action was
filed. Does this system maximize the role of boards of directors as
watchdogs of charitable efficiency? The plaintiffs in the Morris case similarly
argued to the court that this result was not logical.' 8 While the court
seemed to be sympathetic to the arguments of the plaintiff, it stated that it
was the job of the North Carolina Legislature to alter a statute that does not
conform with public policy, and until that time, the court is bound by the
plain wording of the statute.'59 The court also noted that the attorney
general of the state has standing to protect the public's interest in charity and
investigate any allegations of wrongdoing.' 6° In the next section, the
156 589 S.E.2d 419 (N.C. Ct. App. 2003).
157 Id. at 422-23. But c. Richelieu v. Kirby, No. 157001, 1999 WL 262444 (Va. Cir. Ct. 1999)
(holding that the Virginia Nonstock Corporation Act did not prohibit former members and directors of
a charity from instituting a derivative action where there were allegations that the corporation had acted
ultra vires or of willful misconduct on the part of officers and directors. The case was dismissed on the
grounds that Virginia law requires that a demand be made upon the charity to bring such an action before
it is independently filed. Here, no demand was made upon the respondents to bring an action on behalf
of the Humane Society and so the case was dismissed).
158 Morris, 589 S.E.2d at 423.
159 Id.
160 Id.
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effectiveness of states' attorneys general in relation to charitable enforcement
will be discussed.' 6'
There are many problems with relying upon the members of boards of
directors of charities to act as a check upon a director or directors who are
motivated by self-interest. States' Nonprofit Corporation Acts vary from
state to state' 62 and often sharply limit the circumstances under which a
board member may bring an action on behalf of the charitable organization.
On one end of the spectrum, there is the statutory road blocking of board
members who are acting as we would want them to in adhering to their
fiduciary obligations to the public, while on the other end, we have
disinterested board members who either through complacency or outright
indifference are not nearly the check on executive action as are their for-
profit counterparts. In either instance, we would do well to remember that
the existence of a nonprofit board of directors is not the equivalent check on
executive action as it is in the for-profit realm, and more needs to be done
to ensure that the public's interest in charity is safeguarded.
E. The State Attorney General
In every state, state attorneys general are entrusted with the
responsibility of safeguarding the public's interest in charity either by statute
or by common law."63 In theory, they are to oversee all charitable activities
within their state and have standing to sue a charity insider for any breach
of fiduciary duty. On its face, this would appear to have the matter settled;
that the attorney general will handle any suits that need to be instituted
against charities or their directors and executives within that state.
The difficulty with relying on the attorney general to investigate and
correct anywrongdoings of charities is threefold. First, the attorneys general
of the respective states are woefully understaffed, particularly in the
charitable sectors." 4 Hand-in-hand with the first problem is the fiscal
161 See infra Part V.E.
162 Twenty-nine states have adopted all or part ofthe Revised Model Nonprofit Corporation Act
of 1987. For an in depth discussion of how various states have approached the problem of whether to
use corporate law or trust law to deal with charitable organizations, see Thomas L. Greaney & Kathleen
M. Boozang, Mission, Margin, and Trust in the Nonprofit Health Care Enterprise, 5YALEJ. HEALTH POL'Y, L.
& ETHICS 1 (2005).
163 Vinson, supra note 112, at 244-45 (2004). See also Gary, supra note 9, at 622.
164 Gary, supra note 9, at 623 (reporting that a 1994 study of attorneys working in the charitable
sections of states attorneys generals offices found that Connecticut had four attorneys working in the
division, Massachusetts had seven and NewYork had seventeen. Many other states, however, had one
assistant attorney general supervising the nonprofit sector as only one part of his or her assignment.
Hawaii reported .5 attorneys working with charities, and many states do not list any attorneys specifically
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difficulties facing almost all state governments. Due to budgetary
constraints, the effectiveness of the attorney general is sporadic at best.'
65
This results in a large number of charitable abuses falling through the cracks,
as the attorney general is forced to selectively prosecute only the worst cases
of abuse based upon the amount of money involved, the size of the
organization, the impact on the public, and the egregiousness of the
conduct."6 Each year in the United States, eighty thousand new companies
petition the government for a tax-exemption as a Section 501(c) (3) organiza-
tion. 167  Budgetary constraints are simply not allowing states' attorneys
general to keep pace with the ever growing class of entities that claim a tax-
exemption as charitable organizations each year. Lastly, while a lack of
resources may prevent an attorney general from prosecuting a case, so too
may a conflict of interest in a particular case. It must be remembered that
attorneys general are political officials and they may not want to drag the
name of a prominent citizen through the mud in a charitable investigation.
'While the states' attorneys general are an indispensable cog in the
machinery of charitable enforcement, it is all too evident that they are
overburdened as it is and unable to keep up with the rapid growth of
organizations in the charitable sector. Professor Harvey Dale has
commented,
Government regulators (and most particularly attorneys general, to
whom the law confides the principle role in policing charities) tend
to allocate their scarce regulatory resources to other more politically
potent portions of their domains. In most states, the Charity Bureau
of the Attorney General is inactive, ineffective, overwhelmed, or
some combination of these.' 6s
Some have suggested that private parties could serve as a needed
supplement to the authority of the attorney general, 69 but this would be a
assigned to charitable matters). For more statistical information on the shortage of assistant attorneys
general assigned to charitable matters see Number of Full-Time Equivalent (FTE) Attorney Positions by
Selected Practice Areas: "Public Protection" (Nat'l Ass'n of Attorneys General), 1997, at 18, 20 [hereinafter
"Public Protection"].
165 Public Protection, supra note 164, at 39.
166 Id. See also, Gary supra note 9, at 623.
167 HILL & MANCINO, supra note 6, 1 1.01, 1-2.
168 Fishman, supra note 55, at 268 (quoting from Peter Swords, NonprofitAccountability: The Sector's
Response to Government Regulation, 25 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REv. 413,419 n.17 (1999)).
169 See Hansmann, Reforming Nonprofit Corporation Law, supra note 91, at 607. See also Evelyn
Brody, The Limits of Charity Fiduciary Law, 57 MD. L. REV. 1400, 1431 (1998) (stating that "attorneys
general rarely pursue their rights with the same zeal that private parties exhibit").
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delicate balance because, as previously noted, the courts have an interest in
limiting the class of persons who may institute an action against a charity so
that such organizations are not subjected to "vexatious" or "harassing"
litigation. 170 Therein lies the question; how do we at once protect charitable
organizations from constant attack in the courts, but also provide assistance
to the existing state and federal enforcement agencies that are already
overburdened, underfunded and understaffed?
PART VI: ENFORCEMENT SOLUTIONS: AN EXPANSION OF
STANDING AS AN AGENCY SUPPLEMENT
Much of our time thus far has been devoted to examining the
regulations and agencies that are in place to ensure that directors of
charitable organizations comply with the law. We have seen the
shortcomings of these safeguards and have reached the point at which
criticism must end and innovation must begin. By now it is apparent that
there are only two feasible solutions to increasing enforcement in the realm
of charitable fiduciary law. We must either increase funding for agencies,
such as the IRS and state attorneys general, that are charged with the
oversight of nonprofit entities, or we must supplement their efforts by
expanding the class of persons who are able to institute an action against the
director of a charity on behalf of the public in order to enforce their
fiduciary responsibilities. Unfortunately, pinning our hopes on the former
is likely to lead only to disappointment, as both federal and state budgetary
constraints make it extremely unlikely that charitable enforcement sectors
will be given priority over other more politically pressing concerns. That
being the case, we must try to strike the delicate balance between providing
sufficient oversight of nonprofit organizations to force compliance with
existing law while still protecting these valuable entities from harassing and
vexatious litigation. First, let us look at how courts have begun to recede
from the rigid application of standing doctrine in certain circumstances and
allow others who meet certain criteria to challenge the actions of charitable
organizations.
A. Special Interest Doctrine
While the attorney general has traditionally enjoyed her role as parens
patriae,"7 ' or the exclusive protector of the public's interest in charity, the
170 Hansmann, Reforming Nonprofit Corporation Law, supra note 91, at 607.
171 In re Milton Hershey School, 867 A.2d 674 (Pa. Commw. 2005).
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courts have not entirely turned a blind eye to the realities of our legal world.
Over time, both state and federal courts have begun to recognize the
political and fiscal restraints that often tie the hands of state attorneys general
and prevent them from policing violations of nonprofit organizations in the
way that they would like. Onejudicially created solution to the problem of
inadequate charitable enforcement at the state level has been to relax the
traditionally rigid standing requirements for plaintiffs through the special
interest doctrine.1
Special interest doctrine originated in the area of private trusts where
beneficiaries were typically a smaller and more easily identifiable group than
is the case with larger public charities. 73 While trustees have generally been
considered to have standing to sue in both the area of private trusts and the
charitable sector, beneficiaries in the charitable sector have had a much more
difficult road to travel when trying to enforce the duties of a nonprofit
organization. 174  This is because it is often the case that the class of
beneficiaries of a given charitable organization is a shifting class; that the
group is too large and amorphous to have a clearly defined interest in the
operation of the charity. 1
75
The overarching theme of special interest doctrine is that the plaintiff in
question must have an interest that is distinct from that of the public at
large. 76 Certainly, the appeal of expanding the special interest doctrine from
private trust law to the area of charitable enforcement has merit for the
simple fact that it is likely to eliminate the harassing and vexatious litigation
of charitable entities that opponents to expanded standing in the charitable
sector predict. This is because a plaintiff who has a "special interest" in the
efficient and lawful operation of the charity in question is presumably
seeking to uphold the best interests of both the charity and the likely
beneficiaries of such.' 77
In order to determine whether a given plaintiff has the requisite special
interest in a charity such that they should be granted standing to sue, courts
172 For a more in depth discussion of special interest doctrine and how it has been applied in
various cases see Blasko, supra note 28, at 61-67.
173 Id. at 59.
174 Gary, supra note 9, at 618.
175 Students of a university are a prime example of a large and amorphous group ofbeneficiaries
who have been identified as lacking the requisite "special interest" to be granted standing to sue. See
Trustees ofDartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819); Russell v. Yale Univ., 737
A.2d 941,942 (Conn. App. Ct. 1999). But cf Jones v. Grant, 344 So.2d 1210 (Ala. 1977) (stating that a
student body, faculty and staffhad standing to institute a class action against a college, its president and
board of directors for misuse of federal and church funds).
176 Hooker v. Edes Home, 579 A.2d 608, 609 (D.C. 1990).
177 Blasko, supra note 28, at 61.
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have utilized a five-factor test. The elements of the test include the
following:
(1) the nature of the benefited class and its relationship to the
charity;
(2) the extraordinary nature of the acts complained of and the
remedy sought;
(3) the state attorney general's availability and effectiveness to
enforce the trust;
(4) the presence of fraud or misconduct on the part of the
defendants; and
(5) subjective and case-specific circumstances.
17 8
However, for purposes of determining standing, at least one court has
noted that little weight, if any, should be accorded to either the nature of the
acts complained of or the presence of fraud or misconduct on the part of the
defendants.Y9 The underlying rationale of this assertion is that if courts
were to allow allegations of grave misconduct to confer standing on
individuals, this would undermine the purposes of limiting standing in order
to protect trustees from vexatious litigation.'"s Where acts of serious
misconduct have occurred, the attorney general should be sufficient to
enforce the rights of the public. 18' As such, the attorney general's availability
and effectiveness is a more important factor for consideration.1 2 In their
1993 article, Blasko, Crossley, & Lloyd agreed that attorney general
effectiveness is a key factor.183 There, the authors noted that "[i]n those
jurisdictions where the attorney general is heavily involved in charities
regulation, courts generally will take a dim view of private parties attempting
to step into the attorney general's role to seek enforcement of charitable
fiduciary duties. '' "s
While the availability of the attorney general is an important factor for
consideration by the courts, perhaps the most important consideration is the
178 Id. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS S 391.





183 Blasko, supra note 28, at 70.
184 Id. In re Clement Trust, 679 N.W.2d 31, 35 (Iowa 2004) (denying partial standing to the
beneficiaries ofa charitable trust who had unsuccessfully attempted to have the Attorney General ofIowa
challenge the actions of the trustees).
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exact nature of the complaining party's relationship to the charity.' In
order to be granted standing to challenge the actions of a charity, a plaintiff
or class of plaintiffs must show that their interest in the charity is "distinct
from that of members of the public at large. " 18 6 Courts require such a
specially defined interest in the charity in order to reduce the likelihood of
subjecting charitable organizations and trustees to suit when they make
decisions with which members of the public are displeased."n An oft cited
example of a plaintiffwho was denied standing to bring an action against the
trustees of a foundation because he lacked a special interest in the trust is
Kania v. Chatham. 188 In Kania, a candidate for an undergraduate scholarship
brought an action seeking removal of the trustees of a private foundation for
their decision to deny him a scholarship."s The student asserted that he had
a special interest in the execution of the trust because he was a "potential
beneficiary" of the trust.' 9° This, the court stated, was fatal to his case
because a plaintiff who brings an action on the basis of a special interest in
a charitable trust must have a more definite interest than simply being a
potential beneficiary subject to the discretion of the trustees.' 9' Here, we see
again the concept of the business judgment rule being applied to charitable
organizations. 1'2 Courts simply do not want the unpleasant task of second-
guessing the discretion and judgment of charitable executives and trustees.
185 Clement Trust, 679 N.W.2d at 37-38 (stating that individuals must show that they have a special
or definite interest in the trust or are entitled to receive a benefit before they will be granted standing);
Hookerv. Edes Home, 579 A.2d 608,614 (D.C. 1990) (holding that a class ofpotential beneficiaries may
have standing to enforce a charitable trust where the class is "sharply defined and its members are limited
in number").
186 Hooker, 579 A.2d at 609.
187 Blasko, supra note 28, at 74.
188 254 S.E.2d 528 (N.C. 1979). See also Warren v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga., 544
S.E.2d 190,193 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that "those who enjoy the status ofbeneficiaries onlywhen
selected by the trustees are generally held to have no right to initiate a suit for the enforcement of a
charitable trust").
189 Kania, 254 S.E.2d at 529.
190 Id. at 530.
191 Id. The idea that a "potential beneficiary" can never have a special interest in the execution
of a trust was rejected in Hooker, 579 A.2d at 608, 614, in favor of a view that potential beneficiaries can
have a special interest in enforcing a trust if "the class is sharply defined and its members are limited in
number."
192 See discussion supra Part IV.A.
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B. The Inconsistency of the Special Interest Doctrine as a Means of Granting
Standing.
In examining how courts have relaxed the standing requirements for
plaintiffs in the charitable arena through the use of the special interest
doctrine, it becomes apparent that various courts are engaging, at least in
some sense, in a balancing test. On one side of the equation, we have the
interest in ensuring that charitable organizations are adhering to the existing
laws that govern them. On the other side, there is a strong interest in not
subjecting charities to lawsuits which could deplete valuable resources that
were intended for the entity's stated charitable purpose. To assure the
efficient functioning of the charitable system in this country, both the public
at large and the charitable industry have a strong interest in both sides of the
equation.
93
For all of the successes of the use of special interest doctrine by courts
to supplement the efforts of agencies charged with charitable enforcement,
the inconsistency with which the doctrine is applied across the country is
staggering. As previously stated, the five-factor test listed in the Restate-
ment194 and the Blasko article' 9s is at best a guideline for courts that may
choose to place more emphasis on one factor over another to reach a desired
result.' 96 As would be expected of such a situation, factually similar cases
have produced different outcomes, with some plaintiffs being granted
standing to bring suit while other similarly situated plaintiffs are turned
away. 197
1. THE IRREBUTTABLE PRESUMPTION OF THE THREAT OF VEXATIOUS
LITIGATION
If courts are truly engaged in balancing the public's interest in charitable
compliance with the laws and the charitable entity's interest in not being
subjected to harassing and vexatious litigation, how is one to measure each
193 A vicious cycle can be seen appearing here where the donating and benefiting public certainly
does not want a charity constantly subjected to the threat of litigation. However, without the deterrent
effect of the threat of litigation, how can the public be assured that charities are adhering to the laws they
are to follow? Additionally, the charitable industry has a strong interest in reducing lawsuits, while also
complying with the law so as to avoid the appearance of impropriety that may serve to deter the public
from donating money to their charity.
194 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 391.
195 Blasko, supra note 28, at 61.
196 See supra notes 179-184 and accompanying text.
197 See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
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side of the equation? The threat of harassing and vexatious litigation as the
by-product of a particular lawsuit is immeasurable. In the hands of a court
that is simply unwilling to grant standing to an interested party for whatever
reason, this unquantifiable factor can be assigned infinite weight in the
balancing of public and charitable interests. It is beyond dispute that
opening the door to any member of the public to challenge the actions of a
charity is unwise. But what of those whose knowledge and insight into the
functioning of the challenged organization place them in a unique position
to bring the organization back into conformity with its stated charitable
mission? Would expanding standing in the charitable realm actually lead to
the downfall of the industry and force nonprofits to battle constant lawsuits
as doomsday theories have warned? We can see an analogy, although an
imperfect one, when we look to the history of standing in administrative
proceedings.9
In the case of Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v.
Federal Communications Commission,199 members of the listening public sought
standing to intervene in a license renewal proceeding of a Mississippi
television station that they charged with discrimination and promotion of
segregationist views. 200  The Federal Communications Commission
("FCC") denied standing to the listening public due to rigid adherence to a
requirement that an intervenor suffer a direct and economic injury in order
to have standing.21 In addition, the FCC argued that was the "prime arbiter
of the public interest" and that it could effectively represent listener interests
without the aid and participation of listener representatives.2 2 The view of
the FCC here can be seen as analogous to the court's view of the role of the
attorney general as parens patriae, or the sole protector of the public interest
in charity. Both agencies are entrusted with protecting the interests of the
general public in their respective areas of law.
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in Church of
Christ took a very functionalist and liberal view of the role of the FCC. That
court noted that practical circumstances necessitated an expansion of
standing that would not require an economic injury to intervene in a
198 It is acknowledged that standing to intervene in an administrative proceeding, such as a
licensing, is not an exact analogy to standing to bring an action in an Article IIjudicial proceeding. This
section is only meant to illustrate that reformation in a given area of law will not always result in
catastrophic failure of the system. Those who felt that expanding the class of persons who were entitled
to participate in administrative proceedings would overburden the administrative system have not seen
their fears borne out.
199 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
200 Church of Christ, 359 F.2d at 997-98.
201 Id. at 1000.
202 Id. at 1003.
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licensing proceeding.2 3 "The Commission of course represents and indeed
is the prime arbiter of the public interest, but its duties and jurisdiction are
vast, and it acknowledges that it cannot begin to monitor or oversee the
performance of every one of thousands of licensees."2' The court then
continued,
The theory that the Commission can always effectively represent the
listener interests in a renewal proceeding without the aid and
participation of legitimate listener representatives fulfilling the role
of private attorneys general is one of those assumptions we
collectively try to work with so long as they are reasonably adequate.
When it becomes clear, as it does to us now, that it is no longer a
valid assumption which stands up under the realities of actual
experience, neither we nor the Commission can continue to rely on
it.. 205it.. . s
The court in Church of Christ noted that the limited staff and resources
of the FCC made it impossible for that agency to oversee all licensees." It
further realized that some mechanism was necessary to protect the legitimate
interests of the public that could not be served by the FCC.27 As a result,
the court rejected the "'oft-expressed fear' that a 'host of parties' will
descend upon [the agency] and render its dockets 'clogged' and
'unworkable '' 2" and stated that "[t] he fears of regulatory agencies that their
processes will be inundated by expansion of standing criteria are rarely borne
OUt.
"2°9
At this point, it seems necessary to reiterate that the discussion of the
Church of Christ case is not meant to be a perfect analogy to standing in the
context of Article III jurisprudence. Instead, it is offered as an example of
how traditional notions of the role of an agency, whether the FCC, the IRS,
or states' attorneys general, can become outdated by the realities of the
impossible tasks laid before them. Just as the Court ofAppeals for the D.C.
Circuit recognized that it was unrealistic to think that the FCC could
203 Id.
M4 Id.
205 Id. at 1003-04.
26 Church of Christ, 359 F.2d at 1005.
W7 Id.
2M Id. at 1004.
2 Id. at 1006. The court here notes that restraining factors such as the expense of participation
in the administrative process will often keep those with even a large economic interest in the proceeding
from participating.
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adequately protect listener interests by monitoring all of its many licensees,
the rapid growth of nonprofit entities in this country is quickly making
oversight by understaffed agencies a daunting task.21 °
The Internal Revenue Service and the Charitable Divisions of States'
Attorneys General are diligently working to win as many battles as possible.
Yet, fiscal realities have predetermined that they will lose the war unless
others are allowed to aid them in their fight to protect the public's interest
in charitable functioning. Now is the time to carefully expand standing in
the charitable sector and challenge the indefinable and immeasurable
prediction that harassing and vexatious litigation will ensue. This author
suggests that few individuals will be in a position to have sufficient
knowledge regarding the operations of a particular charity to bring a claim
for malfeasance or breach of fiduciary duty. For those with such
information, carefully drafted legislation will prevent harassing lawsuits by
precisely definingwhich persons have standing to bring a claim and the strict
procedures that must be followed in order to do so.
2. ARE COURTS DETERMINING STANDING OR REVIEWING THE MERITS
OF A CLAIM?
It seems as though many courts may not be determining if the plaintiff
has standing to have the court reach the merits of their claim as much as
they are evaluating the merits of the claim to see if they want to grant
standing. Many courts seem to be asking the singular question; is this the
type of harassing and vexatious litigation that standing doctrine in the
charitable realm is designed to prevent?211 Other courts have skewed the
question so as to ask if the plaintiff at hand is likely to bring vexatious
litigation against the charity.212 Whether or not a certain party would be
likely to institute harassing litigation against a particular charity becomes
more a matter ofsubjective assessment by thejudge and less a decision based
upon the objective factors listed in the special interest test."'
210 See discussion supra Parts V.C, V.E.
211 Hooker v. Edes Home, 579 A.2d 608, 616-17 (D.C. 1990) (granting standing to limited class
of beneficiaries in part because "the interest here is to vindicate a collective interest in the continued
availability of that benefit-an interest affected by a proposed exercise of discretion that will change the
nature of the institution-the prospect of recurrent, vexatious litigation is minimal.").
212 In re Milton Hershey School, 867 A.2d 674, 690-91 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2005) (stating that
"[flurthermore, the risk of vexatious or unreasonable litigation by the Association if virtually non-
existent in this case.").
213 See supra note 178 and accompanying text. While it is true that the fifth factor in the test is
subjective and case-specific circumstances," giving this factor too much weight would obviate the need
for the other factors. The factors of the test listed in Restatement (Second) of Trusts S 391 should be
186 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 14:147
The more relevant question that should be answered by a court is
whether granting standing to the party before it will open the door to
harassing litigation by creating precedent for other similarly situated persons.
The former, and more subjective, question seems to turn standing doctrine
on its head by giving judges the power to choose from among similarly
situated plaintiffs as to who will be allowed to bring their claim. One New
York court has even distorted charitable standing doctrine to the point where
it was suggested that if an individual brings a claim against a charity without
the possibility for pecuniary gain, then they should be granted standing.
2 14
While this abbreviated analysis certainly simplifies the job of the courts in
determiningwhether a plaintiffhas standing, it is seemingly miles away from
the five-factor test that has been traditionally used to determine a special
interest to bring a claim in the interests of a charity.2 15 After all of this, how
can we reach a solution where parties interested in the effective functioning
of a charitable organization can clearly understand their rights under the law
by ensuring that standing to enforce charitable responsibilities is either
granted or denied on a more consistent basis?
C. A Callfor Legislative Action.
The foregoing discussion should not be interpreted as a hostile attack on
courts who have relaxed the rigid standing requirements to allow interested
parties to challenge the possible misconduct of charitable fiduciaries or
entities. Certainly, this article argues in favor of a revised system that will
permit interested parties to be able to initiate such challenges. However,
while consistency may be "the hobgoblin of little minds,"216 ajudicial system
that lacks consistency in an area of law demands guidance and reform. As
the law exists today, an interested party and his or her lawyer may have a
used to evaluate the interested party's relationship to the charity so that the court can determine if that
party will be a motivated and interested party; this is the primary purpose of the doctrine of standing.
Allowing courts to use subjective feelings about the complaining party or a class of claims generally to
deny standing invites inconsistency. As well, it works to defeat the purpose of the special interest
doctrine by ignoring the complaining party's interest in the charity and placing emphasis on whether or
not the judge feels that the party may have an ulterior motive.
214 Smithers v. St. Luke's-Roosevelt Hosp., 281 A.D.2d 127, 138-39 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001)
(stating, "Moreover, the desire to prevent vexatious litigation by 'irresponsible parties who do not have
a tangible stake in the matter and have not conducted appropriate investigations' has no application to
Mrs. Smithers either. Without possibility of pecuniary gain for himself or herself, only a plaintiff with
a genuine interest in enforcing the terms of a gift will trouble to investigate and bring this type of
action.").
215 See supra note 178 and accompanying text.
216 Ralph W. Emerson, Self-Reliance in RALPH WALDO EMERSON 131,137 (R. Poirier ed., 1990).
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hard time knowing whether they will have standing to bring their charitable
claim until ajudge rules on the matter.
It is entirely necessary and appropriate for state legislatures to respond
to the charitable enforcement problem that exists within all fifty states by
supplementing the efforts of overworked and underfunded states' attorneys
general with a precisely defined category of persons who may challenge the
actions of a charitable fiduciary. The special interest doctrine was seen by
courts as a way of alleviating the problem of selective charitable
enforcement, but the application of this doctrine has fallen short of being a
consistent solution. When judicially created doctrines can be easily
manipulated to create wildly inconsistent results for similarly situated
parties, it is the legislature's duty to announce the public policy so as to
provide guidance that will bring such cases into conformity with one
another. In the next section, model legislation is proposed that would codify
the spirit and purposes of the special interest doctrine while at the same time
providing more defined criteria for determining standing so as to eliminate
subjective merit-based evaluations by courts.
D. Proposed Model Legislation
The Model Legislation that follows should be viewed as a rough
guideline for state legislatures who recognize that the charity sections of
their respective attorney generals' offices are overburdened. Now is the time
to institute a system whereby interested citizens, who have a stake in a
charitable organization, can be proactive in ensuring that such organization
is conforming to the dictates of the law. Legislation by state policy makers
will serve to guide courts as to what procedures must be followed by
complainants in order to preserve a charge. Additionally, the new law will
help to specifically define those who are entitled to bring a charge due to a
special interest in the charity or unique circumstances that would lead them
to have knowledge of the operations of the charity beyond that of a member
of the general public.
It is true that any new legislation must carefully balance the need for
more rigorous enforcement in the charitable sector with the need to shelter
charities from frivolous lawsuits. In striving to achieve such a balance,
careful statutory drafting is necessary such that strict adherence to
procedural guidelines is required and any charging party who obtains legal
counsel will be aware, prior to the filing of a formal complaint, whether a
court will recognize that they have standing to enforce the charitable duties
of the organization.
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THE NONPROFIT RESPONSIBILITY ACT
It shall be the public policy of this state that efficient and lawful
charitable functioning through the enforcement of the laws governing
nonprofit entities be a priority for courts faced with such cases. The
procedures set forth in the following sections for the filing of a charge
against a charitable organization with the State Attorney General or the filing
of a formal complaint after Attorney General review are to be strictly
adhered to by presiding courts. The failure of a charging party to timely file
a charge with the Attorney General, or complaint with the court, shall result
in dismissal of such party's complaint.
(1) Definitions:
(a) "Charge"-Informal allegation of misconduct on the part of
a charitable organization or insider that is filed with the
charitable division of the Office of the Attorney General.
Such allegation must be supported by particular facts
including, but not limited to:
(i) the specific acts of misconduct that are alleged;
(ii) the party or parties alleged to have committed the
misconduct;
(iii) the date or approximate date of the alleged
misconduct;
(iv) the personal knowledge upon which the allegations
are based; and
(v) the charging party's relation to the nonprofit
organization in question.
(b) "Interested Party"-Any person who possesses knowledge
or has an interest in a particular charity beyond that of the
general public. Such parties should include, but are not
limited to:
(i) employees of the charity;
(ii) former employees of the charity;
(iii) any member or former member of a board of
directors, whether compensated or serving on a
volunteer basis;
(iv) members of the nonprofit organization;
(v) beneficiaries of the nonprofit's mission who have
been identified for receipt of charitable action; and
(vi) donors who had conditioned their donation upon
an action subsequently not undertaken by the
nonprofit organization.
ENFORCING NONPROFIT FIDUCIARY DUTIES
The word "identified" in subsection (1) (b) (v) of this statute should
not be interpreted to mean "identified by name." Rather, a
beneficiary qualifies as an interested party within the meaning of
that subsection if such beneficiary is a member of a group or class of
citizens that have been targeted for receipt of charitable funds or
action.
(c) "Formal Complaint" or "Complaint" - Civil action filed by
the Office of the Attorney General or the charging party
with the court after a reasonable investigation by the
Attorney General has been undertaken and a decision of
action made by that Office.
(d) "Discovery"-As used in subsection (3) of this statute,
discovery on the part of the charging party shall be
construed to mean actual knowledge of misconduct and not
"knew or should have known" of the misconduct.
(2) The sections of this statute shall apply in all cases involving
allegations of fraud, malfeasance, misappropriation of funds, breach
of fiduciary duty, or any other act of self-dealing by a private
foundation or public charity insider within the meaning of such
terms as used by the Internal Revenue Code.
(3) Where any interested party, as defined in subsection (1) of this
statute, alleges misconduct on the part of a nonprofit organization
or insider of such organization, a charge of charitable misconduct
must be filed with the State Attorney General within 90 (ninety)
days of the incident of misconduct or within 90 (ninety) days of the
discovery that misconduct has occurred.
(4) Upon the filing of a timely charge, the charitable division of the
Office of the Attorney General shall conduct a reasonable
investigation into the facts upon which the allegations of
misconduct were based. Such investigation shall conclude within
180 (one-hundred eighty) days with a finding by the Office of the
Attorney General. At or before the conclusion of the 180-day
investigation period, the Attorney General shall send to the charging
party a brief finding of fact and a notice of recommended action in
any of the following forms:
(a) Attorney General Intervention-The Office of the Attorney
General has investigated the facts and has determined that
there is cause for the filing of a formal complaint. Such
complaint will be filed by the Office of the Attorney
General against the alleged offender(s) within a timeframe
to be determined by that agency.
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(b) Attorney General Nonintervention-The Office of the Attorney
General has investigated the facts and has determined that
there is cause for the filing of a formal complaint. Such
formal complaint will not be filed by the Attorney General,
but may be filed by the charging party within 90 (ninety)
days of the receipt of this notice.
(c) Finding of No Cause-If at the conclusion of a reasonable
investigation, the Office of the Attorney General finds that
there is no cause for the filing of a formal complaint of
misconduct against the nonprofit organization or
organization insider based upon the facts, such shall be
communicated to the charging party. At such point, the
charging party may still file a formal complaint with the
court subject to the restrictions of subsection (6) below.
(5) Where a charging party receives a notice of nonintervention
pursuant to subsection (4)(b) of this statute, the Office of the
Attorney General shall be copied on all filings to the court of both
the plaintiff and defendant. Further, the Office of the Attorney
General retains the right to intervene in the proceeding at any stage
of the litigation, and for either party, in the event that it is
determined that intervention is the public interest.
(6) Upon the filing of a formal complaint by either the Office of the
Attorney General or the charging party, the notice of recommended
action of the Attorney General shall be attached to the formal
complaint for review by the court. Where the Attorney General has
made a finding of no cause and a charging party has proceeded with
the filing of a formal complaint against the nonprofit organization
or insider without any new evidence or extraordinary circumstances,
such may be grounds for a dismissal of the case and assessment of
attorney's fees against the complaining party at the discretion of the
presiding judge.
(7) Standing-Upon the filing of a charge with the Office of the
Attorney General, such Office will review the charging party's
relation to the nonprofit organization in question to determine if
they are an interested party within the meaning of subsection (1) (b).
In the case of a notice of recommended action pursuant to
subsection (4)(b) of this regulation, the Attorney General's
assessment that the charging party is an interested person shall be
determinative and binding on the courts. In no circumstance may
a party who has been granted the right to sue by the Office of the
Attorney General upon a finding of charitable misconduct have his
or her case dismissed for lack of standing. This subsection is
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inapplicable to a finding of no cause notice of recommended action
in subsection (4)(c).
(8) Damages-In all cases that fall under this statute, any claim for
damages shall be paid directly to the charitable organization and not
to the charging or complaining party. This subsection does not
apply to requests for injunctive relief by a charging party.
(9) In any case where the complaint of a charging party leads to a
recovery of misappropriated funds by a charitable organization,
whether by way of settlement or judgment, the original charging
party is entitled to receive the lesser of an amount equal to 5% (five
percent) of the misappropriated funds or $1,000 (one thousand
dollars).
(10) Attorney's Fees-In any case where an interested party has been
granted a right to sue upon a finding of cause but nonintervention
by the Office of the Attorney General, the attorney of the charging
or complaining party is entitled to reasonable fees and costs
associated with the action where damages are assessed against a party
charged with misconduct. Where such party is found by ajudge or
jury to be innocent of any wrongdoing or misconduct, fees shall be
paid to the charging or complaining party's attorney by the charging
or complaining party.
Vii. CONCLUSION
The preceding Model Legislation is not a panacea, but it would alleviate
many of the problems of charitable enforcement that exist today. While
some may read the foregoing and feel that it only requires more work from
an already overburdened state agency; that is not the case. The preceding
legislation grants to states' attorneys general the power to allow interested
parties of a charity to reduce their workload. Any state's Office of the
Attorney General can choose to pursue only those charges where it is
determined that there is cause for filing a formal complaint, but where the
original charging party is not an interested party within the meaning of the
statute. In all other situations, the Office of the Attorney General can simply
oversee the case and intervene only if it determines that such intervention
is necessary to protect the public's interest in charity.
21 7
As the law exists today, there are very few individuals who have standing
to enforce the fiduciary obligations of a nonprofit director or executive. The
agencies that are entrusted with this monumental task, namely state
217 See Model Legislation § 5.
192 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAWREVIEW [Vol. 14:147
attorneys general and the IRS, are overburdened and underfunded to the
point where a supplement to their efforts is badly needed. Various courts
have attempted to fill the enforcement void in the charitable sector by
relaxing traditional standing requirements through use of the special interest
doctrine. However, these decisions have been marred by inconsistency and
unpredictability to the point that a new, legislative solution is required. State
legislatures must heed the call and resolve the confusion that exists as to how
and when an interested party seeking to enforce the fiduciary obligations of
a charitable executive is entitled to have his or her case heard on the merits.
Nonprofit entities are an invaluable part of our efficient capitalistic
machine and serve to supplement the efforts of the government by providing
services which are essential to the well-being of all citizens. That being said,
the potential for abuse within the system is overwhelming because the
checks that exist to restrain for-profit executive action lack nonprofit
equivalents and enforcement by designated agencies is sporadic. Everyone
affiliated with the nonprofit industry wants to ensure that charitable entities
are not subjected to harassing and vexatious litigation. We cannot reach this
goal by simply turning our heads and looking the other way, nor can we
truly rely on the integrity and conscience of nonprofit fiduciaries to force
them into compliance with the law when no one is looking.
